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The Castle of Intelligence: Camp Ritchie Maryland and the Military
Intelligence Training Center during the Second World War.
Abstract

Abstract: During the Second World War, Camp Ritchie, Maryland played an important role in the training of
intelligence soldiers. This camp was one of the many that taught men the various ways to gather intelligence
on a battlefield. From aerial photography to prisoner interrogations, soldiers learned the skills required to
gather information, make sense of it, and propose plans based on what they knew about enemy troop
positions and movements. These skills would be put to the test once the men graduated their six months of
intensive training, and were sent abroad to assist in the war effort. Despite Camp Ritchie being an important
aspect of the war effort, not much literature has been produced on the activities of the camp and its men
during the war. This paper will serve to provide a look at the role this camp played during the Second World
War by exploring the paths of three men who were trained at this camp: Karl Hornung, William H. Bilous, and
Edmund Winslett.
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The Castle of Intelligence: Camp Richie
Maryland and the Military Intelligence
Training Center during the Second World War
By Kevin M. Aughinbaugh
~~
Introduction
“German forces have made a landing on the Eastern
seaboard, have pushed forward from PHILADELPHIA to
HANOVER, PA… ‘you will make a reconnaissance in the area
BLUE RIDGE SUMMIT – FLINT – ZORA – McGINLEY HILL
– FAIRFIELD – JACKS MOUNTAIN – BLUE RIDGE
SUMMIT. Your mission will be to obtain information…
concerning the following: Enemy motorized or mechanized
movements; enemy identifications; the condition of the road
between IRON SPRINGS and BLUE RIDGE SUMMIT.’”1
Although no assault ever touched the continental US during
WWII, scenarios such as this were common for the students at the
Military Intelligence Training Center (M.I.T.C.) located at Camp
Ritchie, Maryland. These exercises were used to train soldiers to
quickly respond to new military developments, conduct
intelligence operations, and report on the information gathered.
Although conflict was located an ocean away, the training
exercises that students at the M.I.T.C. participated in brought the
war to the mountains of northwestern Maryland.
Camp Ritchie played an important role in the American
war effort during the Second World War, as it served to train
soldiers and officers in the US Army the various skills they
“Practical Exercise in the Preparation of Messages and Reporters,” ca. Spring
1942, Military Intelligence Training Center, Karl Horning Papers, Box 1, Folder
2, Camp Ritchie Maryland.
1
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needed, to gather military intelligence in the field. Although
military strength and tactics are important components to winning
battles, acquiring and utilizing military intelligence is crucial if
commanders wish to reduce risks and capitalize on their gains on
the battlefront. Commanders have repeatedly beaten the odds by
utilizing gathered intelligence effectively and out-maneuvering
their opponent during conflict.2 The skills the soldiers picked up at
Camp Ritchie, which were learned both quickly and methodically,
were invaluable on the battlefront. The men who graduated from
the M.I.T.C. at Camp Ritchie served their field commanders well
during battle by analyzing situations and providing quick reports
on enemy movements. Furthermore, these graduates played
meaningful roles following the engagement, as they would work to
interrogate prisoners and analyze photographs to provide
intelligence for the next battle.
Background and Historiography
Nestled in a dale in the rolling green hills of the Blue
Ridge Mountain Range, a secret military training facility is one of
the last things anyone would think to find in such a bucolic
location. Once a place for the wealthy to summer, the Cascade area
in Maryland became the ideal location for such a base due to its
secluded location and terrain. Originally, the land was utilized as
part of the Buena Vista Natural Ice Company, which opened for
operation in 1889. The company planned to cut and sell natural ice
in the winter to sell to the wealthy summer visitors. However due
to the combination of the advent of affordable refrigeration in
2

These battles include the First Manassas Battle (Bull Run) in 1861, the Battle
of Tannenberg in 1914, the Battle for Midway in 1942, and the Battle at Inchon
Harbor in 1950. In each of these battles, intelligence played a crucial role in
obtaining victory. Gregory Elder, “Intelligence in War: It Can Be Decisive;
Winning with Intelligence,” Central Intelligence Agency, Accessed December 9,
2017 from https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csipublications/csi-studies/studies/vol50no2/html_files/Intelligence_War_2.htm.
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homes and cinders from steam locomotives contaminating the ice
during winter, the Buena Vista Ice Company shuttered its
operations and closed for good in the early 1920s.3
In 1926, the Maryland National Guard purchased the
property along the existing Western Maryland rail line, which was
constructed to service the now defunct Buena Vista Ice Company.
After purchasing the property, the National Guard proceeded to
renovate the location for use as a summer training base for its
recruits. The new camp was christened “Camp Ritchie” after the
Maryland Governor, Albert C. Ritchie. Between 1926 and 1941,
the Maryland National Guard utilized the base primarily as a
summer training base. Since training only took place over the
summer months, only minor improvements were made to the base.
These included a parade ground, firing ranges, and a few structures
such as “The Castle,” (fig. 1) which served as the main
headquarters, was modeled after the castle unit insignia of the
Corps of Engineers that had built the base.4
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the American war
effort began in earnest. Although President Franklin D. Roosevelt
and the Chiefs of Staff had been trying to prepare the nation for the
coming conflict, the nation’s military was underprepared for a war
on a global scale. In 1942, the War Department took over control
of Camp Ritchie to repurpose the base as a national training center
for military intelligence. Camp Ritchie was in an ideal location for
such a base, due to it being secluded in the mountains as well as
John A. Miller, “Camp Ritchie During World War Two,” Emmitsburg
Historical Society, Accessed November 5, 2017 from
http://www.emmitsburg.net/archive_list/articles/history/ww2/camp_ritchie.htm.
4
John A. Miller, “Camp Ritchie During World War Two,” Emmitsburg
Historical Society, Accessed November 5, 2017 from
http://www.emmitsburg.net/archive_list/articles/history/ww2/camp_ritchie.htm;
Becky Dietrich, “Camp Ritchie, Maryland – Development of the Intelligence
Training Center,” Books, Writhing, History and the Ritchie Boys, Accessed
November 5, 2017, from http://www.klangslattery.com/blog/entry/camp-ritchiemaryland-development-of-the-intelligence-training-center
3
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having a climate and terrain similar to that of Germany. As a
result, The Military Intelligence Training Center was established at
Camp Ritchie with the mission of training soldiers and officers in
interrogation techniques, aerial photography, map reading, and
intelligence gathering, along with other important skills that would
help the military gather intelligence during combat.5
Camp Ritchie played an important role in the war effort, as
the skills gleaned here by select soldiers was used overseas in the
design of battle plans, the gathering of information, and the
interrogation of enemy soldiers. Although Camp Ritchie played an
important role in the American war effort, few works have been
produced about the base. To date, only two notable accounts of the
base exist: a historical documentary titled “The Ritchie Boys,” and
a book, Sons and Soldiers. Both follow a select group of soldiers,
who would become known as the “Ritchie Boys.” The Ritchie
Boys were mostly direct descendants from Europeans, or were
German Jews who had escaped to America in the years preceding
the war. The army preferred these men, as they already knew
European languages such as German, which would prove useful in
interrogating captured enemy combatants. Although the two
above-mentioned works shed lights on the work of this select
group of men, little attention is given to the rest of the roughly
19,000 men, including intelligence officers, interrogators, and
photographic analysists who were trained at this camp.
Karl Hornung, Education at the M.I.T.C.
The selection process to be assigned to Camp Ritchie
involved finding men suited to the job of intelligence work. Men
Miller, “Camp Ritchie During World War Two,” Accessed November 5, 2017
from
http://www.emmitsburg.net/archive_list/articles/history/ww2/camp_ritchie.htm;
Steve Blizard, Fort Ritchie 1926 – 1998 (Gettysburg: Herff Jones Yearbook,
1998) 56-75.
5
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who knew several languages, such as German, French, or a number
of eastern European languages were preferred. Additionally,
previous experience in working with prisoners or on security
details, such as in the Military Police, was also an advantage.
These skills would aid the men in their task of gathering
intelligence from enemy POWs.6
One such soldier who trained at Camp Ritchie during the
war was Karl W. Hornung. Arriving in 1942, through the
traditional wrought iron gate with the title “Camp Ritchie” proudly
displayed above it, Hornung could see that he was one of the first
men to pass in to this new camp. At this time, major construction
was still taking place at the camp, as it had just recently been
turned over to the Army from the National Guard. As Hornung
spent his time at Camp Ritchie learning about intelligence
gathering, the Camp itself was in the process of expanding and
settling in to its new role. For both Hornung and Camp Ritchie, the
first year of instruction was a learning process, and a time of
expedited development.7
Once at the camp, the men would embark on an intensive
education regimen that trained them in specialized areas of military
intelligence. Hornung arrived at Camp Ritchie in March of 1942
and immediately began his training in intelligence. His training
took him through a strenuous course of study, beginning with the
basics of army structure and ending with practical exercises on
how to react to an enemy attack, all of which prepared him to serve
the future unit he would be attached to during battle. 8
“Personnel Placement Questionnaire,” ca. Fall 1942, William H. Bilous Papers,
Box 1, Folder 2, Camp Ritchie Maryland.
7
Karl Hornung Collection, Box 1, Folder 1, Camp Ritchie Maryland.
8
1942, Military Intelligence Training Center, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1,
Camp Ritchie Maryland. During the early stages of training, most soldiers were
placed in to small groups, which could be attached to larger units in theater.
However, this was a constantly evolving practice depending on the
specialization of the individual, current war needs. As shown later on, men
6
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Jammed into small, hastily-built classrooms (fig 2.) with
class sizes hovering around 18-24 men, Hornung’s instruction
began with a need to understand how the US Army was structured
and how it operated. He learned the chains of commands for
different army groups and divisions. For example, Hornung
learned how the chain of command for an infantry battalion is
different from an artillery battalion. Additionally Horning learned
the roles that the general staff plays in shaping operations and
making decisions, as well as how information flows both up and
down the command structure. This was important knowledge for
Hornung, as he was expected to quickly provide the proper
information to the correct officers so that important decisions
could be made in a timely manner under chaotic battlefield
conditions.9
Once Hornung and his classmates had completed their
lessons on the structure and organization of the US Army, they
began instruction on the basics of intelligence and informationgathering during conflict. It was important for the men to learn to
be able to differentiate between information and intelligence, and
then decide what intelligence was actually useful to the current
situation. Typically, information is regarded as the raw data that is
gleaned by the soldier. This information could range from simple
weather reports, to casual conversation with local residents who
may have seen military operations taking place. Intelligence,
however, is the “value-added” portion of information where the
soldier takes all of the threads information that were gathered, sorts
through them ,and then weaves them together to form a coherent

trained in photographic intelligence would be placed in to teams that would
serve together in theater.
9
Blizard, Fort Ritchie 1926 – 1998 57-60.; “Extract from Staff Officers’ Field
Manual,” 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 1, Camp Ritchie Maryland.
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picture of the entire scene that entails both what is known along
with what will likely happen as developments occur.10
Factors such as terrain and weather could play a large role
in how the enemy would maneuver and act during a battle;
consequently, it was important for Hornung and his classmates to
understand these factors in order to provide proper information to
commanding officers. Something as simple as a change in the
cloud cover could affect how soldiers would react in different
situations, such as their ability to utilize aircraft for both
reconnaissance, and combat. This lack of aircraft could prove
advantageous to the allied forces, as enemy aircraft would not be
able to operate effectively under heavy cloud cover. However, it
would also hinder the allied efforts to establish air cover.
Intelligence analysts such as Hornung had to use weather reports,
and knowledge about climatic patterns to anticipate weather
conditions, and then create reports on how those weather
conditions would affect both the troops and equipment.11
In addition to weather, terrain also played an important
role in intelligence gathering as it could both be an advantage and a
detriment to forces fighting on the ground. Terrain is an important
feature to consider during military campaigns as the landscape can
change how a unit is fighting. Forests may provide excellent cover
from enemy observation; however, they also increase difficulty in
maneuvering vehicles and large numbers of men. Conversely, open
fields can allow for easy movement, but also leave units and
vehicles exposed to enemy attack. Intelligence officers had to be
able to weigh the costs and benefits of the terrain types to their
own men, as well as know how to predict enemy movements
across the landscape.
“Intelligence Exercise,” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 2,
Camp Ritchie Maryland.
11
“Military Aspects Climate Elements” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1,
Folder 2, Camp Ritchie Maryland
10
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To understand how the terrain in a particular area varies,
students took a number of map-reading and drawing courses at the
M.I.T.C. These included basic map-reading courses, where
soldiers learned to identify symbols and locate objects on a map, as
well as more advanced courses, where students were required to
create and update their own maps of a particular area. For many of
these exercises, the instructors at Camp Ritchie utilized the
surrounding area. Local small towns such as Sabillasville,
Maryland, and Blue Ridge Summit, Pennsylvania, were the object
of study for many of these classes. Hornung was required to map
out road networks and draw in terrain features as well as the
elevations of mountains and hills surrounding the towns.12
Another important aspect of mapping taught at Camp
Ritchie was how to read and employ maps from other nations.
While similar, the symbology on Allied maps could vary in design
and meaning, which could lead to confusion. Students learned how
to identify which symbols corresponded to the different
nationalities among the Allies, and what each symbol meant. For
example, the symbol for a dirt road on an American map may be a
brown line. However, on a British map, that same dirt road may
have been symbolized as a dotted black line. Intelligence soldiers
who were interpreting these maps, needed to know the different
meanings in symbols to effectively communicate and work
closely with the Allied forces in Europe. 13
In addition to learning how to interpret and utilize different
Allied maps, students such as Hornung, at the M.I.T.C. learned
“Conventional Signs and Symbols” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1,
Folder 1, Camp Ritchie Maryland; “Military Aspects Climate Elements” Fall
2942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 2, Camp Ritchie Maryland “Maps
and Map Reading Lessons No 1-5,” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1,
Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland; “Hand Drawn Maps, and Mapping tools” Fall
1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland.
13
“Test on British Symbols,” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 2,
Camp Ritchie Maryland; “British Identification Marks,” Fall 1942, Karl
Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 2, Camp Ritchie Maryland.
12
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how to translate and exploit captured enemy maps. In many ways,
a captured German map could prove more valuable to an
intelligence officer in the field than a comparable map produced by
the Allies. Enemy maps could contain information regarding troop
placement, lines of fortification, and potential battle plans, all of
which were of high value to Allied Commanders who were
creating battle plans. Something as simple as a designated road on
a German map could tip off a trained officer. Was there going to be
a troop movement along the road? Was the road mined or
hazardous? Or was this one of the main lines of communications
for the enemy army? By taking in this information, along with
other information gathered from observations and various reports,
a trained intelligence man could interpret the conditions and
provide the necessary intelligence a field commander would need
to make a well-informed decision.14
Once the basics of creating, interpreting, and using maps
was established, Hornung progressed to more advanced techniques
of using aerial photography to gather ground information and make
sense as intelligence. The practice of using aerial photography for
reconnaissance and intelligence during combat became popular
during the First Word War. Even before early aircraft could be
fitted with armaments, missions were being flown over the scarred
European battlefields to photograph the snaking trench lines and
gather information on enemy troop to artillery placement. Students
at the M.I.T.C. learned how to use images taken from aircraft and
deduce enemy ground strength, fortifications, and mechanized
units. Using stereoscopes and exact duplicates of images spaced a
few inches apart, two-dimensional photographs would appear to be
“German Conventional Map Signs,” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1,
Folder 2, Camp Ritchie Maryland; “Organization of the German Army,” Fall
1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 2, Camp Ritchie Maryland; “German
Maneuver Exercises,” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 2, Camp
Ritchie Maryland.
14
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in three dimensions. This would assist the viewer in picking out
anomalies in the areas, such as camouflage netting, tents, or
vehicles. 15
The troops would use the information they knew about the
area based on maps, and then combine that with the information
gleaned from the image to create intelligence reports. One of the
main advantages of using aerial photography was that with a single
aircraft, a unit could gather a vast amount of data and be able to
process it rapidly. Previous techniques (which were taught earlier
in the course of study) involved sending troops out into the field to
observe enemy movements and report back to their headquarters.
Although this could be more accurate than a photograph at times, it
was also much more risky and time consuming. Furthermore,
photographs could provide not only a faster but also more accurate
depiction of troop movements. Rather than reports being a day or
two old, photographs could be developed and analyzed within a
few hours of the aircraft landing, providing a more “up to the
minute” view of the battle field.16
One of the last, and arguably one of the most important
skills that Hornung learned during his time at Camp Ritchie was
the art of interrogation of both captured Prisoners of War (POWs)
as well as noncombatant civilians. In terms of intelligence
gathering, having reliable firsthand accounts of enemy troop
movements was extremely valuable. If an intelligence soldier
gained information from a captured POW regarding unit size and
type, other units in the area, or the enemy plans for battle,
15

Allen R. Millett, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis, For the Common
Defence: A Military History of the United States 1607 to 2012 (New York: Free
Press, 2012), 299; “Basic Aerial Photographs Lessons 1-4,” Fall 1942, Karl
Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland.
16
“Basic Aerial Photographs Lessons 1-4” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box
1, Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland; “History of the Photo Intelligence Section
in the Luzon Campaign, ”ca Summer 1945, William Bilous Papers, Box 1,
Folder 13, Camp Ritchie Maryland
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American commanders would have an advantage during the
planning and fighting stages of the battle. Unfortunately, gaining
intelligence from enemy prisoners was typically a tough task.
Lower-ranking enemy soldiers were normally not told much in
terms of the larger picture, and any soldiers who knew information
were usually tight-lipped due to their loyalty to their nation and
their comrades.17
In order to elicit intelligence from POWs, the M.I.T.C.
taught men various interrogation strategies and techniques to use
on captured men. The first part of this lesson focused on how to
treat and where to place POWs, as they were brought in from the
front lines during an active battle. Once away from the front lines,
soldiers would first check the POWs for wounds, and if necessary,
send them to a hospital for treatment. After this initial process, the
remaining healthy POWs would be escorted to a guarded area.
During battle conditions, this could be as simple as a temporarily
designated area with a ring of American guards surrounding the
enemy POWs to await further movement. If necessary, the
preliminary stages of interrogation would begin from this ad hoc
confinement area.18
If time was not as vital and the facilities were available,
POWs would be escorted to a POW camp near the front. Once at
the camp, the American soldiers would segregate the enemy POWs
based on nationality and rank. All prisoners from one nation were
sent to a designated area of the camp, which enabled the
interrogators to quickly select men from the nationality of soldiers
they wanted to interrogate. From there, the enemy officers would
be separated from the enlisted men, which allowed an American

“Analysis of ‘Name, Rank and Number’ Film” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung
Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland.
18
“Instruction on building and running camps” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung Papers,
Box 1, Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland.
17
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interrogator to quickly select the group he wanted to interrogate.
Once this was complete, the interrogations would begin.19
Hornung was trained to gather intelligence from
interrogations in multiple forms. Typically, asking direct questions
on battle plans would not lead very far, as most soldiers would not
easily divulge that sort of information. Rather, interrogators’
training involved learning how to become friendly with the enemy
POWs, and how to “beat around the bushes” to obtain bits and
pieces of information that would help to create a larger picture(fig.
3). When working with enlisted men, seemingly mundane
questions regarding what they saw along their marches, their diets,
or how they felt about their officers could turn up important
fragments of information that could be pieced together to form an
idea about the general situation these men had faced. It was the
intelligence team’s job to sort through the minutia to form a
coherent idea of the larger picture.20
As mentioned earlier, the enemy officers were typically
better informed in terms of battle plans and the general situation;
however, they also tended to be less likely to reveal information.
According to some interrogators, these interrogations would last
hours and sometimes days if the officer seemed particularly
knowledgeable about the battle plans. Again, the interrogators
would try to strike up friendly conversations with the enemy
officers regarding mundane topics such as their religion, values,
hobbies, or home life. The goal was to find areas of the POWs life
that they would be willing to discuss. Ultimately, the goal was to
get the prisoner comfortable enough to sustain a conversation.
Once the prisoner was talking, the interrogator would then try to
subtly guide the conversation in a direction that would
19

Ibid.
“Analysis of ‘Name, Rank and Number’ Film” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung
Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland; “Sample Interview Sheet” Fall
1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland.
20
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consequently have the prisoner unknowingly divulge bits of
information to the interrogator.21
In some special cases, interrogators would find prisoners
who were loquacious and not so tight-lipped, providing a goldmine
of information to the intelligence team. Typically, however, the
men were taught to not expect to gain too much from one
individual prisoner. Rather they were trained to focus on small
pieces of information collected from many POWS to be combined
and used later. Although it was preferred that the integrators
attempted to remain amicable toward the prisoners, it was
sometimes necessary to try other methods to get prisoners to talk.
Once away from the classroom and in the field, the latitude that
these soldiers had in which to conduct their interrogations greatly
expanded.22
Guy Stern and Fred Howard were members of the select
group known as the Ritchie Boys, and they made great use of this
additional latitude to play mind games on the German POWs.
Nearing the end of the European conflict, the pair of interrogators
devised a strategy to frighten the POWs into divulging information
they would otherwise keep to themselves. Knowing that German
soldiers were fearful of being sent to Russian POW camps, Stern
and Howard utilized this fear for their own purposes. One man in
the team would dress as a Soviet representative using previously
captured Russian uniforms (from German war trophies) and other
authentic Soviet paraphernalia. This “Soviet” soldier would then
be used as a ploy to get the Germans to talk with the implication
21

The Ritchie Boys, directed by Christian Bauer (2004; Toronto, Ont: Tangram,
2007), DVD; “Analysis of ‘Name, Rank and Number’ Film” Fall 1942, Karl
Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland; “Sample Interview
Sheet” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Camp Ritchie
Maryland; “Practice Interview Sheets” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1,
Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland.
22
“Analysis of ‘Name, Rank and Number’ Film” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung
Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland; The Ritchie Boys, directed by
Christian Bauer (2004; Toronto, Ont: Tangram, 2007), DVD.
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that if they cooperated with the Americans they would be sent to
American camps. However if they refused, they would be sent
back to Russia with the “Soviet” officer, to face the Russian POW
camps.23
Once finished with the interrogation, prisoners were again
segregated based on nationality and rank. Additionally, they were
also separated from the un-interrogated POWs to avoid having
information passed on about what questions could be expected.
From there, they would be further processed and sent to POW
camps to be held until a prisoner exchange or the end of the war
occurred. Following the interrogations, the American interrogators
would use the knowledge gained at Camp Ritchie to provide a
large scale picture of events for their superiors.24
During his final weeks of training at the M.I.T.C., Hornung
practiced weaving loose threads of information together to from
cogent reports on the larger situation. Lessons would consist of
providing men with multiple and oftentimes confusing and
conflicting reports. Additionally, the men would practice
interrogations on “German prisoners,” and “local witnesses” about
the events of the exercise.25 From there, the intelligence men
would take the information they had been provided and use it to
create situational awareness to manage the upcoming “battle.”
23

The Ritchie Boys, directed by Christian Bauer (2004; Toronto, Ont: Tangram,
2007), DVD.
24
“Instruction on Building and Running Camps” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung
Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland; “Sample Interview Sheet” Fall
1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland; “Practice
Interview Sheets” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Camp
Ritchie Maryland.
25
During the war Camp Ritchie held a small contingent of American soldiers
who would play act the part of German soldiers during war games. This would
allow the training American soldiers to get a feel for how the German army
maneuvers, as well as how to better spot enemy troops in different scenarios.
Although typically on base, at times the “German” soldiers would be seen by
unsuspecting local residents who became alarmed thinking that the German
army had invaded the US.

27

Again, the local area was utilized for training purposes. Local
towns became the sites of new “battles.” Fairfield PA, - Blue
Ridge Summit PA, - Emmitsburg MD, -Westminster MD,
Baltimore MD, and many others were all “invaded,” “repulsed,”
and “invaded” again by fictitious German armies. Although
humorous at times, these exercises taught the intelligence men
valuable lessons that they would use once they went in to the
field.26
Once the soldiers graduated from the M.I.T.C. at Camp
Ritchie, they would have the ability to serve in many different
roles in the intelligence section of the military. Some of them
would go on to become interrogators in the European Theater of
Operations, including the famed Ritchie Boys. Others would go on
to serve by analyzing documents and other more mundane duties
behind the front lines. Some, such as Sgt. William H. Bilous would
serve as aerial photograph interpreters. For Bilous, Camp Ritchie
was a career-changing assignment that enabled him to be sent
overseas and serve the nation utilizing both his strong character, as
well as his newly-acquired knowledge from Camp Ritchie.27
William H. Bilous, Changes to Camp Curriculum
William H. Bilous joined the Army in 1939 at the age of
24. After going through basic training, Bilous was sent to Hawaii
to serve in the Military Police Hawaiian Department. During his
time in Hawaii, Bilous distinguished himself as a reliable,
hardworking, and trustworthy soldier. Through his efforts, Bilous
26

Many of the exercises, and information that the men received were able to slip
in slight jokes and humor in to very serious lessons. For example when
discussing effective means for camouflage, “DON’T hide under matted
camouflage. It is as conspicuous as a bad haircut.” “Exercises in the German
Attack of the area.” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 8, Camp
Ritchie Maryland
27
The Ritchie Boys, directed by Christian Bauer (2004; Toronto, Ont: Tangram,
2007), DVD; Papers ca. 1941-1945, William Bilous Collection, Boxes 1, 2, and
3, US Army Research and Education Center.
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impressed his superior officers who recommended that he would
be an excellent soldier “for any position requiring a person of
Intelligence, tact, and reliability.”28 From these recommendations,
Bilous would begin a journey culminating in his appointment as
head of a distinguished aerial photography intelligence team in the
South Pacific by the end of the war.29
Following his recommendation for a new position, Bilous
was transferred to the 226th Military Police Company at Fort
Mason, California in early 1942. Following his transfer, Bilous
was first promoted to Corporal on March 28, and was again
promoted to Sergeant less than three months later on June 1. For
Bilous, his hard work and character quickly paid off as his
promotion to Sergeant came with a new base assignment. From
Fort Mason, Bilous was sent to the Indiantown Gap Military
Reservation in South Central Pennsylvania. While serving at the
Military Reserve, Bilous was tasked with guarding prisoners of
war. He served in this capacity to the best of his ability, again
distinguishing himself. His commanding officers urged him to
apply for the infantry Officer Candidate School (OCS) in late
1942, however, by then all available slots were full. Not one to
give up, Bilous then applied to the OCS for army administration.30
Luckily, for Bilous, he was able to secure a spot in the Army
Administration OCS.
Upon graduation on June 23 1943, Bilous was once again
promoted, this time receiving his commission as a second
lieutenant. He returned to the base at Indiantown Gap to continue
“Major, J. P. Evans, to whom it may concern,” September 5, 1941, William
Bilous Collection, Box 1, Folder 1, US Army Research and Education Center.
29
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serving as a Military Policeman (MP) until further orders arrived.
After seven months, those orders arrived: He was sent to the
M.I.T.C. at Camp Ritchie to become trained in Aerial
Photography. On February 2, 1944, Bilous reported for duty at the
front gate of Camp Ritchie. During his five-month stay at Camp
Ritchie, Bilous learned about and worked closely with the aerial
photography unit. Rather than becoming a general intelligence
soldier, Bilous was to become a specialist in aerial photography
interpretation.31
In the two years between training Hornung (1942) and
Bilous (1944), much had changed at Camp Ritchie. During the first
training secession, the trainees learned as much as the Army did.
This first group in 1942 was trained to be general intelligence
personnel. As discussed earlier, Hornung learned a varied range of
skills, including weather interoperation, map navigation, and
prisoner interrogation. The first cadres of men were trained to be
flexible in the field since they were able to perform a multitude of
roles depending on the challenges presented by the location of their
deployment and the needs of their commander. Although this may
sound like a good idea, the army quickly realized that this training
style was not ideal in battle. After this training was applied in
North Africa, the army quickly changed its requirements for
intelligence training, refining the roles of intelligence personnel in
the field.32
Changes to the training regimen at Camp Ritchie continued
throughout the war. However, the most drastic change came in
early 1943. Taking what was learned from training the initial cadre
of men in 1942, the commanders and educators at Camp Ritchie
“Certificate of Second Lieutenant” June 23, 1943, William H. Bilous
Collection, Box 1, Folder 2. US Army Heritage and Education Center; “Orders
to Report to Camp Ritchie” January 5, 1944, William H. Bilous Collection, Box
1, Folder 2. US Army Heritage and Education Center.
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altered the curriculum so that men could better demonstrate what
was learned. This was due in part to the Army’s need to have more
specialized intelligence personnel in the field. Rather than training
the men in a variety of fields to an adequate level, Camp Ritchie
morphed into a training base for army specialists. Additionally, the
change in curriculum was due to a better understanding of what
skills were needed in the field. Training hours were increased to
allow time to teach soldiers about German and Nazi culture,
beliefs, and economics, as well increased attention to unit
identification.33
As the Allied armies advanced through North Africa and
Italy, better information was collected on tactics and strategies
utilized by the Axis powers. In addition to these strategies, enemy
equipment and personnel were captured. As intelligence officers in
the field collected this information and equipment and provided it
to their commanders, some would be shipped back to the US as
training aids for soldiers. Over the course of the war, Camp Ritchie
began to acquire a cosmopolitan identity. Although all of the
soldiers stationed there were American, various sectors of the
camp were demarcated as “German,” “Italian,” and “Japanese”
sectors. In these areas ,mock towns and structures (fig. 4) were
created to train the men in what to expect in each region.
Additionally, Camp Ritchie installed captured enemy equipment to
further enhance the training environment. Selected American
troops would play-act enemy roles using captured equipment in
these mock villages to assist in the training. 34
Two of the most unique structures that were utilized to
assist in training the men were a mock Nazi Rally Arena, and half
of a farmhouse. American soldiers would be sent to the Mock Nazi
33
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Arena to participate in a fake Nazi Rally. American actors would
dress as high-ranking Nazi party officials, while other actors would
play the part of Nazi Storm Troopers. Additionally, other actors
would be placed among the crowd of GIs to act as German
civilians. German nationalistic songs were played, and the actors
used Nazi tactics to “stir up enthusiasm” among the Americans.35
The mock arena was constructed as a way to demonstrate to the
soldiers the psychological background German soldiers would
have been accustomed to during over the past ten years.
Throughout the mock rally, American interjections were broadcast
over the loud speakers to alert the soldiers to the blatant lies that
Nazi Propaganda promulgated during the rallies, as well as to bring
attention to the tactics that were used to further indoctrinate
German soldiers under the Nazi movement. 36
Less exotic than a US-staged mock Nazi rally on an
American military base was the cut-away farmhouse (fig. 5). Built
prior to the construction of the Buena Vista Ice Company in 1889,
this farmhouse was situated at the base of a small hill. Sitting
abandoned for well over fifty years, it was transformed into a
demonstration area. Bleachers were installed on the hillside and the
wall facing the bleachers was demolished. This produced an area
where a group of men could watch instructors demonstrate how to
raid a house and check for both enemy combatants as well as
important documents. Demonstrating invaluable lessons, such as
room clearing and searching for documents among the nooks and
crannies in a house, this location played an important role in the
education of soldiers. 37
Although specializing in aerial photographic interpretation,
Bilous still had to take other courses, such as map interpretation
and weather prediction, to round out his education. Along with
35
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general classes, to become specialized in aerial photographic
interpretation he has set of specialized courses to train him in this
field. This course of study consisted of ten hours of instruction in
basic aerial photography, six hours of ground photography, five
hours of camouflage study, and eight hours of selection of battle
positions. One of the unique techniques that Bilous learned during
the course was called the “Floating Line Method of Photographic
Observation.” In essence, this technique was used to determine
unobstructed lines of sight. The intelligence officer was to assess
an aerial photograph and imagine a floating line from a vantage
point toward the region where he wished to observe. If this
imaginary line “floated” to that point, there was a clear line of
sight. If the line “dug in” to a mountainside, or other obstacle, the
line of sight was blocked. By all accounts, this floating line method
worked reasonably well. However, this aerial photography course
was not the only redesigned class that Bilous took while at Camp
Ritchie, as he was also able to take advantage of a new set of
courses on the Japanese.38
Unlike with the Nazis and the Italians, capturing Japanese
prisoners and equipment proved difficult. The tradition of bushido
in the Japanese culture encouraged soldiers to either die fighting or
commit suicide; becoming a prisoner of war was considered
dishonorable. Additionally, it has been noted that unlike the
European Theater, the Pacific Theater was regarded as more of a
race war, in which American soldiers tended to be less merciful
toward any Japanese prisoners. This combination made it
extremely difficult for Americans to collect and capture significant
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amounts of intelligence, equipment, or prisoners during the early
part of the war (1942-43). 39
By the time Bilous was training at Camp Ritchie, enough
Japanese equipment and materiel had been captured to allow the
creation of a new course on the battle tactics of the Japanese. This
course was similar to those courses teaching men about the
German or Italian armies. Men would learn the unit identification,
army structure, tactics, and battle psychology of Japanese soldiers.
To enhance this class, a few Japanese-Americans reenacted
Japanese battlefield tactics by dressing up in available gear and
using captured weapons. Although small in number, those actors
provided a great deal of important training to the men slated to
serve in the Pacific Theater. Bilous’ increased training in aerial
photography analysis along with the newly developed courses on
the Japanese Army would serve him as he went to serve in the
Pacific theater.40
William H. Bilous, Putting the Knowledge to Work
Upon graduation from the M.I.T.C. at Camp Ritchie,
Bilous received orders to report to Camp Stoneman, in Pittsburg
California on June 18, 1944. Camp Stoneman was built in early
1942 to provide a staging ground for American forces entering the
Pacific Theater. Units from across the nation’s training facilities
moved through Camp Stoneman to be processed, outfitted, and
shipped out in a matter of a few days. As Bilous left the front gate
of Camp Ritchie, he would have had an inkling of where he was
going to be sent. Having been made chief of a photographic
interpretation team and ordered to one of the major processing
David Powers, “Japan: No Surrender in WWII,” BBC, Accessed on December
9, 2017, from
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camps for the Pacific Theater, Bilous would have deduced the
basics of his next assignment as he watched the US countryside
rush by on his three-day train trip to California.41
During his three-day stint at Camp Stoneman, Bilous
checked over his equipment one last time. Rifles and pistols were
fired for reliability and accuracy, shoes and clothing were checked
for excessive wear, and last minute medical care was given to
those who needed it. Camp Stoneman would be the last location
that on the US mainland that these men would stand on for quite
some time. Once Bilous’ unit passed final inspection, it was loaded
onto a troop ship and shipped off to the South Pacific. Crammed
onto a troop ship, Bilous, his team, and hundreds of other GIs
embarked on a cruise crossing the largest ocean in the world.42
Upon entering the South Pacific, Bilous was ordered to the
headquarters of the 5th Replacement Department of the US Army
Air Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). Here, Bilous was placed in
command of the 104th Photographic Intelligence Team. In this role,
Bilous and his team distinguished themselves by providing
valuable analysis of aerial photograph taken by American planes.
By the spring of 1945, Bilous was recommended for a promotion
to Frst Lieutenant. In addition to the promotion, Bilous also
received a Bronze Arrowhead as he and his team “participated in
the initial assault wave (H/2) of the Lingayen Gulf Landing, 9 Jan
45.”43 Not only did Bilous provide valuable services to the ground
forces through analysis of aerial photography, but he also endured
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similar conditions to the assault troops as well. Coming ashore
during an assault landing to quickly provide intelligence to the men
on the battlefield, Bilous was an effective and flexible leader and
intelligence officer.44
Recognition of Bilous’ ability continued throughout 1945.
As a first lieutenant, Bilous was ordered commander of two
photographic intelligence units, the 103rd and the 104th, which were
selected to provide aerial intelligence for the Luzon campaign from
the fall of 1944 to the summer of 1945. Both the 103rd and the
104th were bedeviled by setbacks throughout the campaign when
dealing with aerial intelligence. During his time with the 104th,
Bilous encountered many of the problems that negatively affected
performance of aerial photography in the Luzon campaign. 45
To his credit, none of the responsibility for reported
problems with aerial photography fell upon Bilous’ shoulders.
Rather, Bilous and his team had to deal with the problems and find
solutions. The first few sorties for aerial photography returned poor
photographic coverage of important sites such as beachheads.
Rather than designating specific squadrons for the disposal of the
103rd and 104th Aerial Photographic Intelligence teams, the Army
forced these teams to work alongside the Air Force and Naval
intelligence sections, forcing all three intelligence sections to share
both aircraft and equipment as they carried out their duties.
Although this may have seemed like a sound idea as a way to save
manpower, fuel, and time, it turned out to be a major error. The
Army intelligence teams were tasked with different missions and
objectives than those of the Air Force and Navy, resulting in
inconsistent and inaccurate photographs for analysis. Although this
issue was sorted out with time and stronger communications, other
“Official Papers - Personnel Papers” February 14 -March 18, 1945, William
Bilous Collection, Box 1, Folder 12, US Army Research and Education Center.
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issues continued to plague Bilous and his team throughout the
Luzon campaign. 46
For Bilous’ team to operate effectively, a number of items
required coordination. Proper cameras in aircraft were crucial to
producing high quality images, which could be analyzed both
quickly and accurately. Aircraft had to fly at the proper altitude
and speed for the cameras to snap high quality shots. Once
grounded, film needed to be quickly developed so that prints could
be disseminated throughout the intelligence team for analysis.
Finally, analysis had to be rapid enough to make up-to-date,
informed decisions, while still being highly accurate. At one point
or another, Bilous’ team faced a breakdown in each of these
sections. 47
During the early portion of the Luzon campaign, cameras
used in reconnaissance aircraft were not the correct type. Using
what was available, gun target cameras rather than proper aerial
intelligence cameras were loaded in to reconnaissance aircraft.
Although useful at noting which structures had been destroyed or
which aircraft had been shot down, target cameras did not provide
the clarity or resolution required for proper photographic
intelligence. Another issue that beset Bilous’ team was a lack of
developing facilities. This slowed down the analysis process by
producing a backlog of undeveloped photographs. Furthermore,
this hindered wide dissemination of photographs, as only a
minimal number of images were printed as a way to increase the
speed. There were enough images be analyzed at the team’s
headquarters, but not enough to spread throughout the rest of the
division and for other officers to have a copy. Although these
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problems existed, Bilous and his men were able to provide
adequate intelligence for the Luzon campaign.48
In total, the 103rd and 104th Aerial Intelligence Teams
produced over 750,000 photographic prints of the battle area.
Additionally, with the help of the Army Airforce and Naval
Airforce, over 1,000 individual reconnaissance sorties were flown
during the Luzon campaign, each returning hundreds of images for
analysis. Furthermore, with practice, the Aerial Intelligence units
were able to predict future requests, and with available time, would
process images that might prove useful to commanders before a
request was ever submitted. Finally, these units utilized innovative
photography and analysis techniques to provide more accurate
images and intelligence reports. These techniques included taking
images from both vertical (straight above) and oblique (from the
side) angles to locate and identify enemy emplacements and supply
dumps in the mountainous areas. Although these techniques were
time consuming, they proved to be exceedingly accurate. 49
For coping with these hardships and successfully
commanding his teams, Bilous was once again recommended for a
promotion. Following the surrender of the Japanese, Bilous was
promoted to the rank of Captain as he “conducted the work of his
team in a highly efficient manner and has amply demonstrated his
fitness for promotion to the next higher grade.”50 With promotion
in hand, Bilous was shipped back home on the SS Marine Falcon.
Once ashore, Bilous once again traveled across the nation this time
to Fort Dix, New Jersey. From there he was provided with 45 days
leave and accompanying rations to return home and rest. However
Bilous’ service did not end in late 1945 with an honorable
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discharge from the US Army; rather, Bilous reenlisted to continue
serving.51
Using skills learned at Camp Ritchie, Bilous would
continue to serve with the US Army until he retired in 1959. He
worked in a variety of roles, including Assistant Supervisor of
Prisoners, at Green Haven, New York and Fort Hancock, New
Jersey, and Captain of a unit of MPs. Going overseas again, Bilous
became Chief of Criminal Investigation in occupied Japan, and
finally was promoted to the Officer in charge of Army Photo
Identification Center,
Korea Forward, during the Korean Conflict. In his multitude of
roles in the US Army throughout his carer Bilous was able to use
the skills he had learned at the M.I.T.C. at Camp Ritchie to lead his
men successfully, and provide valuable intelligence reports to his
commanding officers.
Edmund Winslett, Planning the Invasion of Japan
Commissioned in 1917 as an infantry officer, Edmund J.
Winslett was a career military man. At the outbreak of WWII,
Winslett had been an officer for 24 years. Serving as an infantry
officer had taught him many things; however his experience in
WWII would tremendously increase his education. At the outset of
WWII, Winslett was assigned to a coastal protection artillery
battery. As commander of the battery, Winslett was in charge of
ensuring the protection of the American homeland from enemy
invasion. Although chances of a cross-ocean invasion force from
either Germany or Japan were slim, Pearl Harbor had shown that
American Territory was vulnerable to enemy naval attack. 52
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After the US composed itself from the initial shock of the
attack on Pearl Harbor, Army plans were refined and put in to
action. Although older than many of the new recruits to the US
Army, Winslett was a valuable asset. He had years of experience
of as an officer. He was sent off to Camp Ritchie to train at the
M.I.T.C. as an intelligence officer. Taking many of the same
classes that Bilous and Hornung did, Winslett gained a valuable
education that would serve him later in the war. Upon graduation,
Winslett became commander of his own intelligence unit. Initially
shipped off to serve in Europe, he served only briefly, before being
ordered to the Pacific.53
While at Camp Ritchie, Winslett studied photographic
interpretation and found himself as part of a photographic
intelligence team. Following a similar path to that of Bilous,
Winslet was shipped off to the pacific. Serving in the 131st
photographic interpretation team, Winslett and his team were
tasked to aid in the invasion of Luzon. Under similar difficult
conditions to those of Bilous, Winslet and his team performed their
duties to the best of their abilities. Poor communications,
inadequate cameras, and a lack supplies took their toll; however,
much like Winslett’s European assignment, this assignment did not
last long.54
As the tides of the Pacific War began to turn, the likelihood
of an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands was becoming all too
apparent. With increasing resistance during battle and the advent of
the Kamikaze aircraft in in 1944, the Americans had a bitter taste
of the resolve of the Japanese people. If the American Army was
forced to land on the Japanese Home Islands, it was understood
that the logistics involved would be tremendous and that the
casualties would be exceedingly high. Similar to the D-Day
53
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invasion of 1944, any invasion of Japan proper would be a large
undertaking, involving massive amounts of men and materiel along
with a high degree of coordination between air, ground, and naval
forces. A key element to ensuring this invasion would succeed was
ensuring high quality intelligence.55
In 1945, Winslett was ordered to assist in the Japanese
invasion planning.56 Reporting in, he was tasked with using his
skill set that he acquired at the M.I.T.C. and during the war to plan
a portion of the invasions. Providing his skills of both
photographic interpretation and his long experience in the Army,
Winslett and his team aided in creating a battle plan for the
invasion of Japan. The basic invasion strategy was to commence
with invasions originating in the southern parts of the island.
American forces were to come ashore at the isthmuses between the
Kyushu and Shikoku regions, and between the Shikoku and
Honshu regions, thus splitting Japanese forces in to three separate
areas. This would cut lines of communications, and allow
American forces to perform an envelopment maneuver to attack
and capture objectives in discrete sections of the country. After
these initial invasions, two additional invasions were to commence
in each region to further pressure Japanese forces and capture land
area. 57
Although planned for the fall of 1945, the military invasion
of Japan never happened. With the dropping of the two atomic
bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese
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government soon capitulated, thus ending WWII. Still, similar to
Bilous, Winslett did not immediately leave the army. Following
the end of the war, Winslett was promoted to Major and given
command of the Visitors Liaison Office, Headquarters I Corps, in
Japan. He remained at this post throughout the end of the Korean
Conflict, working in public relations as well as negotiating various
issues. 58
Towards the end of the Korean Conflict, Winslett became
part of the group that negotiated prisoner exchanges with the North
Korean government. In this role, Winslett was responsible for
bringing American POWs safely home after the harsh condition in
Korean prisoner camps. Utilizing interrogation skills learned at the
M.I.T.C. at Camp Ritchie, Winslett was prepared to read body
language and use discussion tactics to deduce the real intentions of
his counterpart negotiator. After a long, hard and fulfilling 30-year
career in the military, Winslett retired following the end of the
Korean Conflict.59
Conclusion
Following the end of WWII, Camp Ritchie maintained an
air of secrecy. Following a rapid decommissioning process, it was
once again chosen to be the site of a secret communications base
during the 1950s. As tensions between the US and USSR increased
during the Cold War, new installations were needed to protect
high-level officials from the threat of nuclear war. Carved out of a
mountain less than five miles away from Camp Ritchie, Site-R, or
“The Underground Pentagon,” was designed to house high-level
military officials during any nuclear standoff between the US and
its Soviet counterpart. Now christened “Fort Ritchie,” it was
ideally located to act as one of the main communications basses for
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Site-R, as it was so close to the new base. Fort Ritchie fulfilled this
duty throughout the remainder of the Cold War. Finally, in 1998,
Fort Ritchie closed its doors for good as the US military shuttered
the base in an attempt to reduce costs.60
Although Camp Ritchie now stands a silent hollow shell of
its former self, the camp continues to live on in the memories and
actions of men like Hornung, Bilous, and Winslett. By providing
highly trained officers and soldiers in the field of intelligence,
Camp Ritchie helped win battle from across the sea. Men trained at
Camp Ritchie provided vital information to their commanders as
well as to units on the ground, helping to find enemy units and
reduce American casualties by cutting through the fog of war to
provide a clear battlefield picture. Although one man’s life is not
any more important or valuable than another man’s, the men
trained at Camp Ritchie became force multipliers once in the field.
Taking skills learned at Camp Ritchie and applying them to actual
battel situations, these men gave a decided advantage to American
forces in battle. Whether it be prisoner interrogations, aerial
photography analysis, or map-making, the skills learned at Camp
Ritchie proved to be important for the 19,000 men who graduated
from the M.I.T.C. as they assisted in the American war effort
during WWII as well as throughout the rest of their service to the
nation.

60

7th Signal Command, Fort Ritchie, (Washington DC: MARCOA, 1988), 1-9;
Blizard, Fort Ritchie.

43

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the archivists and staff at both the US
Army Heritage and Education Center and the Western Maryland
Reading Room at the Hagerstown, MD Library, without whose
help this project would not exist. I would also like to thank the
Western Maryland Reading Room for providing the Image Scans
of the Photographs used in this project. Additionally, I would like
to thank Maddison Cramer, Lauren White, and the editors of The
Cupola for helping to edit and revise previous drafts of this paper
and leading me to a finished product. Finally, I owe a great debt to
Dr. Michael Birkner of the Gettysburg College History Department
for his instruction and guidance throughout the course of this
project. Without his help and direction, this project would not exist
in its current form.

44

Appendix

Figure 1. A military parade rolls in front of Camp Ritchie’s
Headquarters, the “Castle” during WWII.61

“Drive by of Jeeps in Front of the Castle” Photographic Image Scans, Western
Maryland Reading Room, Hagerstown Library, Hagerstown MD.
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Figure 2. Men at Camp Ritchie during a coding exercise in the Signal
Intelligence Code Room. Cramped classrooms such as this were common
while Hornung was training at Camp Ritchie in late mid to late 1942. 62

“Signal Intelligence Code Room” Photographic Image Scans, Western
Maryland Reading Room, Hagerstown Library, Hagerstown MD.
62
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Figure 3. Demonstrations of how to properly capture, handle, and
interrogate prisoners were common as they would allow soldiers see
firsthand how their classroom instruction was be used. The “prisoner” in
the middle is an American serviceman playing the part of a captured
German soldier during one such demonstration. 63

“Three Actors” Photographic Image Scans, Western Maryland Reading
Room, Hagerstown Library, Hagerstown MD.
63
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Figure 4. Mock villages and towns, such as this mock German village, were
constructed and used to help train soldiers on what to expect and how to
fight once they reached Germany. 64

“German Man Poses in Snow,” Photographic Image Scans, Western Maryland
Reading Room, Hagerstown Library, Hagerstown MD.
64
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Figure 5. The cutaway farmhouse allowed soldiers to watch actors
carry out maneuvers in confined spaces and search for hidden
documents, offering valuable lessons for intelligence men in the
field. 65

“Scene with a Soldier”[Top] and “Spying [Bottom],” Photographic Image
Scans, Western Maryland Reading Room, Hagerstown Library, Hagerstown
MD.
65
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